AFRICA’S SECOND HALF-CENTENARY: SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT/ CITIZEN SECURITY?

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Abstract: Africa faces an unanticipated ‘second chance’ at the start of the second decade of the 21st century: how many ‘developmental’ versus ‘fragile’ states by 2020? The interrelated prospects for both BRICs & the continent are being transformed by the current global financial crisis: as the South expands & the North contracts, what S-N relations in future? The EU of 27 now includes the PIIGS; a disincentive to African regions to sign EPAs unlike the Caribbean? African political economies are now located in second, third & fourth worlds: will they identify with the G20 and/or the G192 (G193 once Southern Sudan independent at start 2011?). Half the dozen fastest growing countries identified in the Economist’s World in 2011 are African (Economist 2010a): from Ghana to Liberia; the CGD in DC now suggests that 17 African countries are ‘leading the way’; & the BCG has identified 40 African corporations as global ‘challengers’. To maximize its development & security, Africa would need to advance ‘network’ or ‘public’ rather than traditional ‘club’ diplomacy, involving civil society & private companies as well as states & intergovernmental agencies. But climate change may yet emerge as the spoiler, hence the importance of COP17 in Durban before the end of 2011! This paper has four parts which stake out paths to a brighter future for the continent, including its myriad diasporas. First: post-Washington Consensus, ODA from the OECD is of declining importance or attraction. Rather, a range of ‘innovative sources of finance’ are appearing, encouraged by the ‘Leading Group’: global solidarity fund, currency transaction tax, carbon taxes/trading, climate change funds, controls on money laundering & remittance taxes etc. Plus emerging donors like the BRICs & Gulf states, some with SWFs; FBOs; & new private foundation like Gates, Clinton & Ibrahim leading to GAVI etc. Second, Africa has generated an innovative range of ‘new regionalisms’ involving non-state actors: from Maputo Corridor & Kgalagadi trans-frontier peace-park to Nile Basin Initiative/Dialogue; and from International Conference...
INTRODUCTION

Over the next five years...the African economy will outpace its Asian counterpart...

...Africa’s economy will grow at an average annual rate of 7% over the next 20 years, slightly faster than China’s...Africa’s changing fortunes have largely been driven by China’s surging demand...but other factors have also counted...

...Without reforms, Africa will not be able to sustain faster growth. But its lion economies are earning a place alongside Asia’s tigers. (Economist 2011: 73)

Informed by contemporary international relations (Cornelissen, Cheru & Shaw 2011, Dunn & Shaw 2001) /development studies perspectives in particular, this paper enquires into emerging opportunities as well as challenges for Africa/ACBF at the start of the second decade of the 21st century. It especially focuses on whether the emergence of the BRICs/”second world” (Khanna 2009) presents unanticipated possibilities or threats to a heterogeneous continent, one which includes burgeoning ‘developmental’ as well as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states.

Now arguably qualifying for the adjective/accolade ‘miracle’ (Dorr, Lund & Roxborough 2010) at the start of its second half-century, can Africa grow through the next decade given its quite stellar performance in the first decade? The Economist (2011) asserts that the continent contained more than half the top ten economies from 2001 to 2010 (in order of growth): Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique & Rwanda – by contrast to the last two decades of the last century...
when only Uganda so ranked - and a further half-dozen have promising prospects for the first half of the new decade: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Congo, Ghana, Zambia & Nigeria (in order) Such a welcome prospect poses novel challenges for public policy/diplomacy: can Africa bring its non-state - civil society & private sector - as well as state resources to bear in focused & sustained/cumulative/inclusive 'new' 'network' rather than traditional exclusive 'club' diplomacy (Heine 2006)?

As suggested in the final section below, this is the welcome challenge or opportunity facing the ACBF at the start of its second 20 year period: what has it learned & can it adapt after its first two decades given the significantly transformed continental & global context at the turn of the decade: divergent regional incidences of & responses to the 'global' financial crisis with the global South being much less negatively impacted than the established trans-Atlantic core?

ANALYSIS

Varieties of Innovative Sources of Finance

Even before the end-decade 'global' financial crisis, there was a looming gap in funding for African development if it was to even aspire to realizing the MDGs in 2015 etc despite some features of PKOs becoming ODA-eligible under revised OECD DAC rules. In response to such deficiencies as well as the slowness of the 'Monterrey Consensus' to impact ODA effectiveness, France animated a ‘Leading Group’ of states (www.leading-group.org) to suggest other means to advance global public goods. In association with major INGOs in a ‘Forum on the Future of Aid’ (www.futureofaid.net), a ‘Taskforce on International Financial Transactions & Development’ (www.innovativefinance-oslo.no) came to advance the notion of ‘taxation for the governing of globalization’ at decade’s end.

Other alternatives included ODA from new members of the EU of 27 & the BRICs as ‘emerging donors’, the latter reflected in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), for example. And new private foundations have emerged around the turn of the century to parallel established ones like Carnegie, Ford & Rockefeller, notably the Gates Foundation (www.gatesfoundation.org) but now also the Blair (www.tonyblairfaithfoundation.org),
governments in the North like Spain & Korea, with revenues going for ATM vaccines in association with the Clinton & Gates Foundations;

d. carbon taxes/trading (www.carbontax.org), a not uncontroversial set of measures encouraged by the UN IPCC & set of climate change summits, such as Copenhagen COP15, Cancun COP16 & next COP17 in Durban end-2011 (www.cop17durban.com), related to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (www.cdm.unfccc.int);

e. climate change funds such as IBRD Global Environmental Facility (GEF) & UN agencies’ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation & Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) (www.un-redd.org);

f. Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF) established in Geneva (www.dsf-fsn.org);

g. UNITAID, an international drug purchase facility to advance access to ATMs, now with broad inter- & non-state participation (www.unitaid.eu);

h. controls on money-laundering encouraged by the OECD
& G8 - capital flight pa now some US$ 500 billion? - including FATF/CFATF on OFCs over two decades (www.fatf-gafi.org) leading to PWYP & EITI; &

i. remittance taxes on N-S flows which have blossomed to over US$ 300 billion pa, larger for some states like Nigeria or Lesotho than ODA.

...but getting from conceptualization to policies/politics is problematic, which is where ACBF comes in once its capacity is enhanced to engage in such public, open diplomacy. Hence the imperative of animating a timely, extensive coalition to redefine & revive the continent’s direction at the turn of the decade as suggested in iii) below.

**Varieties of ‘New Regionalisms’**

Reflective of its more than 50 states, Africa has been the leading region in the South to advance regional innovations & institutions. In the initial, one-party nationalist period, reflective of jealousy surrounding newly realized independence, these were typically ‘old’ inter-governmental arrangements. But in the post-bipolar era, such regionalisms became less exclusively state & economic & more inclusive around emerging issues like ecology, energy, security, water etc.

First, the revived, redefined East African Community is emblematic: five rather than initial trio of members, with innovative civil society, parliamentary & security dimensions, qualifying as an instance of ‘new regionalisms’ (Shaw, Grant & Corneilissen 2011). Given the scale & resilience of regional conflict on the continent, several attempts have been made at regional peacebuilding, from Darfur to Cote d’Ivoire, especially around ECOWAS, GLR, Hornetc such as the ongoing process around the International Conference on the GLR (www.grandlacs.net). These increasingly involve a range of actors in a heterogeneous coalition, from INGOs to MNCs, as such conflicts are always about ‘greed’ as well as ‘grief’; so resource extraction & accumulation proceeding in tandem with violence, all too often targeting women & children as successive UN reports on the Congo have revealed. And as security is increasingly privatized, so such coalitions become ever more problematic. This is particularly so around energy
& mineral extraction & supply-chains as their products attract the attention of transnational as well as local criminal networks. Shorter-term peace-making is typically tied to longer-term norm-creation to advance sustainable development by regulating the flow of conflict minerals like coltan, diamonds (www.ddiglobal.org) & gold as indicated in the next section (eg Canadian-based but Afro-centric Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals & Sustainable Development (www.globaldialogue.info)).

Second, in the new century, regionalisms on the continent have come to cover the spectrum of levels – macro/meso/micro (Soderbaum & Taylor 2008) – and sectors – civil society, corporate networks, ecology, energy, security etc. While EPZs are associated with Asia & gas pipelines with Central Europe, development corridors & peace-parks are largely a function of Southern Africa’s distinctive political economy. Similarly, Africa has its share of river valley organizations & other cross-border more to less formal micro-regions. The Maputo Corridor has advanced growth in Southern Mozambique as well as the eastern Witwatersrand, reinforcing the cross-border dimensions of the Lesotho highlands water project for electricity & water (www.lhwp.org.ls); the latter was informed by the only global commission to be based outside the North – in Cape Town - which also included MNCs as well as NGOs & states in its membership (Khadram 2004): the World Commission on Dams (www.dams.org). Reflective of growing concern for the environment, Southern Africa is the centre of the trans-frontier peace-parks movement which has led to the recognition of several such cross-border parks in the region (www.peaceparks.org).

Third, encouraged by growing recognition of climate change - NB the development of IBSA into BASIC around COP 15 in Copenhagen at end-2009 - the continent’s river basins are beginning to receive exponential attention as centers of biodiversity, energy, food & water as well as conflict: Congo (www.fauna-flora.org), Zambezi etc; the Nile Basin Initiative (www.nilebasin.org) & Dialogue are arguably the most advanced to date. Symptomatic of emerging tensions is the discovery of oil around the rift valley lakes in northwest Uganda along the border with Congo; such oil production may propel Uganda into
the ranks of the developmental states but it may endanger some of its environment & wildlife, let alone local communities.

Fourth, the continent’s pattern of inter-regional relationships is in flux, from classic, inherited North-South dependencies towards a novel South-East axis around China & India but also Japan & Korea. Symbolically, Africa’s regions’ reluctance to sign EPAs with the EU at the turn of the decade despite a mix of pressures & incentives may mark a turning point as global rebalancing continues: Europe of the eurozone crisis around the PIIGS & Asia of the BRICs transforms policy options & calculations for the continent as suggested in Cheru & Obi 2010. The tone of annual African-China FOCAC palavers can be contrasted to that at the third EU-Africa summit in Tunis in November 2010.

Fifth, given its numerous land-locked states, Africa has always experienced informal cross-border migration & trade, some now in illegal goods like drugs & small arms. And as MNCs, now from China & India as well as South Africa, have increased their investments in energy & minerals, franchises & shopping malls, so their logistics & supply chains have come to define their own regional networks. Exponential infrastructural development will further new regionalisms on the continent in the second decade of the 21st century, symbolized by the mobile-phone revolution and the roles of MTN & Celtel/Bharti, including the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (www.moibrahimfoundation.org).

Finally, sixth, Nollywood has begun to redefine the continent as its overwhelming production of DVDs reaches remote villages & myriad diasporas, just as soccer’s African Cup now plays on mainstream TV in the global North. As the Economist (2010b: 88) indicated at the end of 2010:

Film is now Africa’s dominant medium, replacing music & dance. It links distant societies, fosters the exchange of ideas & drives fashion trends...

Film also profoundly shapes how Africans see their own continent...

Varieties of ‘Transnational’ Governance

In a post-bipolar era, the mix of fragile/failed states, proliferating ‘global’ issues & pressures
for democratization has generated some innovative forms of ‘transnational’ (Brown 2011) or ‘private’ (Dingwerth 2008) governance around the continent, symbolized by the early Ottawa & Kimberley Processes, now augmented by the FCS/REDD & EITI. These may not yet be authoritative & their scope still fails to reach continuing scourges like SALW but they are changing the governance landscape. When combined with innovative sources of finance, they begin to transform the policy terrain for ACBF as it anticipates its second score of years. They have served to encourage inter-state international law towards the recognition of varieties of global governance, which may reflect varieties of sources of pressures.

Part of the unwelcome legacy of the Cold War was fields of landmines. The comprehensive, heterogeneous International Campaign to Ban Landmines (www.icbl.org) led to the Ottawa Process, advanced by the ‘celebrity diplomacy’ of Princess Diana. By contrast, the subsequent Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds (www.kimberleyprocess.com) resulted from animation by a major & minor NGO: Global Witness (London) & Partnership for Africa Canada (Ottawa), respectively. It has since spawned the Diamond Development Initiative to improve artisanal working conditions in the mines through formalization of labor (www.ddiglobal.org), a process which the World Bank has also encouraged through its network for Communities, Artisanal & Small-scale Mining Initiative (CACM) (www.artisanalmining.org).

More recent, comprehensive innovations include the industry-supported Forestry Certification Scheme (FCS) (www.fscus.org) & G8-supported Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (www.eiti.org), the latter being particularly timely given the dangers of ‘resource curse’ & windfall profits around BRIC demand for energy & minerals. Meanwhile, despite the US constitution, an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is slowly being negotiated through the UN along with ISO 26 000 on CSR (www.iso.org). And UN Programmes of Action (PoA) such as decade-old #1325 on women, peace & security & #1540 on SALW do at least serve to keep sensitive issues on the agenda. But despite the scourges of small arms & of violence against women & children, progress on SALW & child
soldiers etc remains problematic notwithstanding advocacy through the International Action Network Against Gun Violence (www.iansa.org). Each of these governance processes include African regional programs to which ACBF should relate with other African networks, including diasporas.

Finally, the continent might follow Central America in advancing beyond not only national security but also human security, towards ‘citizen security’. This contemporary notion seeks to combine freedom from needs/want with issues around SALW: how to keep citizens both safe & developing in sustainable ways? UNDP (2011) in the Caribbean & Central America at the turn of the decade began to explore such prospects in its regional human development reporting.

CONCLUSIONS & POLICY SUGGESTIONS

Onto Varieties of Innovative Analyses/Policies?

Burgeoning varieties of finance, governance & regionalisms pose challenges to public policy in & around the continent; they also present challenges to African & related analyses as they demand ‘innovative’ perspectives & policies, both state & non-state; ie civil societies, private companies, media etc. Hence the timeliness of ACBF’s celebration of its first two decades: what next?

Africa at the turn of the decade is at a crossroads in terms of growth, development, governance, regionalisms, sustainability etc: can it seize its second chance & transcend its somewhat lackluster first half-century? In turn, can ACBF advance into its own second 20 years by advancing inclusive public or network diplomacy of non-state as well as state actors for the most marginalized continent in the global South? Africa’s place at the center of innovative sources of finance & styles of governance leads to optimism while the number of conflicts & fragile/failed states leads to skepticism even pessimism: what balance by 2020/2025/2030?

BIOGRAPHY

Professor Timothy M Shaw holds a masters degree from Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda from the late-1960s & a Princeton PhD from the mid-1970s. He has been a student of the continent for over four decades
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